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The aim of economic warfare is to inflict maximum pain at minimum cost. Achieving that is hard when the target is a key commodity producer. The EU’s agreement to ban most Russian oil imports reflects justified outrage at the barbaric invasion of Ukraine. But it may prove to be ineffective.
经济战的目的是以最小的代价造成最大的痛苦。当目标是一个关键的大宗商品生产国时，很难实现这一点。欧盟(EU)同意禁止大部分俄罗斯进口石油，这反映了对俄罗斯野蛮入侵乌克兰的义愤。但它可能被证明是无效的。
The problem with oil is that it is traded internationally. Higher prices may compensate Russia for reduced volumes, as US Treasury secretary Janet Yellen argued in April. Equally, customers in the EU and outside it may swap sources of supply in response to price signals, with little ultimate impact on the Russian exchequer.
石油的问题在于它在国际上交易。正如美国财长珍妮特•耶伦(Janet Yellen)今年4月所说的那样，油价上涨可能会弥补俄罗斯出口量下降的影响。同样，欧盟内外的客户可能会根据价格信号交换供应来源，而对俄罗斯财政部的最终影响很小。
The lower the level of substitution, the more powerful the partial embargo. Some countries, for example, lack refineries that can process Urals, Russia’s sulphurous main export blend.
替代水平越低，局部禁运就越有力。例如，一些国家缺乏能够加工乌拉尔原油（俄罗斯主要出口的含硫混合油）的炼油厂。
That is not a problem for China and India. They have already moved to fill the gap in demand for Russian oil created by self-sanctioning by European refiners and traders. India rarely bought Russian oil in the past. But it emerged as the largest purchaser of Russian Urals crude in April, according to S&P Global.
这对中国和印度来说不是问题。它们已经采取行动，填补欧洲炼油商和贸易商自我制裁造成的俄罗斯石油需求缺口。印度过去很少购买俄罗斯石油。但标普全球(S&P Global)的数据显示，今年4月，印度成为俄罗斯乌拉尔原油的最大买家。
Asian countries may not take up the full slack in demand for Russian oil, however, fearing retaliatory western sanctions. Capital Economics thinks Russia’s oil exports will fall by a fifth this year, even allowing for a 15 per cent rise in exports to non-western countries. But after factoring in higher prices, the consultancy estimates that Russia’s oil export revenues will be $180bn, a mere $2bn lower than in 2021.
然而，亚洲国家可能不会完全填补俄罗斯石油需求的缺口，因为它们担心西方的报复性制裁。凯投宏观(Capital Economics)认为，俄罗斯今年的石油出口将下降五分之一，即便对非西方国家的出口将增长15%。但该咨询公司估计，在计入油价上涨因素后，俄罗斯的石油出口收入将达到1800亿美元，仅比2021年减少20亿美元。
The gap between Brent and Urals crude — currently $31 — may eventually fall in response to substitution. One response from the west may be to ban its insurers from covering tankers carrying Russian oil. Creating friction of a logistical kind is one way of compensating for a lack of it in markets.
布伦特原油和乌拉尔原油之间的价差（目前为31美元）最终可能会因替代买家而下降。西方的一个回应可能是，禁止其保险公司承保运载俄罗斯石油的油轮。制造物流方面的摩擦是弥补市场摩擦缺乏的一种方式。
Even after the oil embargo is fully phased in next year, it may be more than offset by higher gas prices. The oil embargo reduces Europe’s financial complicity. It will not, by itself, sabotage the Russian war machine.
即使在明年石油禁运全面实施后，它也可能被更高的天然气价格所抵消。石油禁运减少了欧洲与俄罗斯的金融勾结。它本身不会破坏俄罗斯的战争机器。