{"text":[[{"start":6.68,"text":"In a retreat humiliating even by Donald Trump’s standards, the US president last November withdrew threats of tariffs against China in return for Beijing agreeing a year-long ceasefire on export controls of rare earths and other minerals. His administration says it’s used the time since to boost its own production of minerals and secure supplies from allies, trying to reduce Beijing’s hugely powerful leverage from critical raw materials."}],[{"start":32.6,"text":"That claim is wildly overblown. Going up against China would not just require huge financial firepower to support companies and provide guaranteed prices to producers but a ruthless commitment to productive efficiency — and to building a lasting international coalition to secure minerals not found in the US. Instead, the administration has displayed its familiar cronyism, inept attempts at coercion and a capricious America-first foreign policy. This shreds its credibility in anchoring an international mineral agreement."}],[{"start":62.56,"text":"Certainly there’s been a big flurry of activity, both financial and bureaucratic. The administration has made the extraordinary step of taking equity stakes in several companies and a bewildering array of purchase guarantees, credit support, loans and grants which it claims total $30bn. The overseas initiative with the most teeth is a deal signed with Australia last October which has led to US investment in mining projects there."}],[{"start":87.6,"text":"But beyond Australia and one or two countries vulnerable to pressure such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, the US has typically deployed only coercive one-sided bilateral trade agreements, along with seeking to convene an international coalition of the willing. Neither seems a serious threat to Chinese dominance."}],[{"start":105.76,"text":"These “gunboat deals” have had provisions inserted to try to force trading partners to exclude other countries as customers and export their minerals to the US rather than to their own industries. These lack the legal and economic credibility to succeed."}],[{"start":120.04,"text":"Take, for example, Indonesia, which produces two-thirds of the world’s nickel, used in batteries, solar technology and wind turbines. Over the past decade Chinese companies have invested heavily in the country to create a complete nickel supply chain from mining to finished product. Trump attempted to rival this with a deal coercing Indonesia into supplying the US, but it was heavily undercut when his threatened tariffs were declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court in February."}],[{"start":148.16,"text":"The administration has rushed to impose replacement tariffs, but those too are legally and politically uncertain, and Indonesia has yet to ratify the agreement. Such a shambles will not override Indonesia’s relationship with China, based on genuine investment and solid results."}],[{"start":164.8,"text":"The administration’s broader plurilateral ambitions also have serious credibility issues. In February, Trump convened 54 countries to secure critical minerals supply chains. One of its first attempts to make this concrete was within the G7, which met in France in June. But to create a genuine challenge to Chinese production, any programme would need to include a demand-side strategy, and to set up price floors that would guarantee producers’ revenues even in the face of Chinese dumping. European governments in particular were highly suspicious: they had little trust that the US would set a pricing formula in anyone’s interest other than its own."}],[{"start":201.44,"text":"The EU has not forgotten Trump’s attempts to annex Greenland for its minerals in January. There was a convenient reminder of those ambitions over the past month when the Greenland government had to warn off a mining consortium linked to the Trump-aligned TV host “Dr Phil” from starting to drill for oil without permission. The wider process of handing out money to mining companies has involved billions of dollars being given to companies often with little record in the area and with financial ties to figures within the Trump administration."}],[{"start":230.36,"text":"This jumble of a campaign compares very badly with the fierce focus of the Chinese government over decades. A clumsy attempt to coerce Japan with rare earth controls in the early 2010s, undercut by widespread smuggling by wildcat miners, has been supplanted by the creation of a tightly controlled supply chain, consolidating production into two main groups (China Rare Earth Group and China Northern Rare Earth). The companies operate under strict state control including limits on the international dissemination of related technology and very serious criminal consequences for smuggling."}],[{"start":264.32,"text":"Supply interruptions from Chinese export controls remain a constant threat. There was a recent sudden leap in the price of erbium, a particularly niche rare earth, following fears that it would be restricted once the export restriction ceasefire ends in November."}],[{"start":278.72,"text":"The US remains a far richer economy per head than China’s. But when it comes to dominating and controlling economic chokepoints like critical minerals, America’s inept leadership frequently leaves it trailing. By the end of the ceasefire, the US will have done little to render China’s trade weapons any less powerful than before."}],[{"start":302.48,"text":""}]],"url":"https://audio.ftcn.net.cn/album/a_1787271972_3369.mp3"}